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## EVIDENCE OF CUBAN SUPPORT FOR KATANGAN INSURGENTS

It is our judgment that the Cubans have been involved in training and advising the ex-Katangan exiles-- who call themselves the FNLC--at bases located in Angola since 1975; we do not believe that the Cubans have participated in the fighting inside Zaire. The Cuban government clearly had foreknowledge of the attack. Cuban President Fidel Castro, during his meeting with the Chief of the US Interests Section on May 17, stated that Havana had received reports that the Katangans were preparing for another incursion and claimed that he had "warned" Angolan President Neto to prevent it.

Cuban advisers doubtless assisted the rebels in their preparations for the incursion this month as well in the invasion of 1977. We believe that the Cubans and Soviets have supplied the FNLC with some weapons and equipment, but reporting on this point is less conclusive as compared to that on training. There have been several unconfirmed reports of Cuban personnel accompanying the insurgents in the most recent incursion. Similar claims during the 1977 invasion were never proven.

Virtually all of the credible evidence on the character of Cuban and other foreign Communist involvement has been provided [REDACTED]

Nevertheless, the wide variety of sources as well as the consistency of the reporting make a convincing case against Castro's denials of any direct or indirect involvement during the past two years.

Castro's message to the US Government was that:

- There are no Cubans with the Katangan forces in Shaba,
- Cuba has had no participation either directly or indirectly in the Shaba affair,
- Cuba has provided no weapons or other material to the Katangan forces,

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- Cuba has not trained the Katangan forces,
- Cuba has not had any contact with the Katangans for at least two years.

In our view, only the first of these assertions is correct.

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25X1 [REDACTED]  
25X1 [REDACTED] on 8 May that Angola and  
25X1 Cuba had been helping the insurgents, particularly with  
25X1 arms and training. [REDACTED] [REDACTED]  
25X1 [REDACTED]  
25X1 [REDACTED]

25X1 [REDACTED] was told during extensive conversations  
25X1 [REDACTED] that two Cuban and six  
Angolan advisers accompanied the rebels when they  
started moving out of Angola in early May. [REDACTED]  
added that Katangan "political commissars", who had been  
trained in Angola by Cubans and East Germans, were  
assigned to each group of 50 rebels,

25X1 [REDACTED] n  
25X1 [REDACTED] stated in early May 1978 that Cuban, Soviet, and East  
German personnel were engaged in the training of FNLC  
rebels in Angola,

25X1 --In October 1977, [REDACTED]  
25X1 [REDACTED] that 1,500 FNLC recruits in  
Angola had just completed their training and were under  
the control of Cuban and East German instructors,

25X1 --In August 1977, [REDACTED]  
25X1 [REDACTED] had said  
that the Cubans were training some 2,000 Katangans in  
northeastern Angola.

There is strong evidence from other reporting that Cuban involvement with the FNLC preceded the first Shaba invasion.

- In May 1977, several Katangans who took part in the first Shaba incursion reported that the Angolan army

and its Cuban military advisers had helped train the insurgents and had coordinated closely in the planning of the invasion,

--According to [redacted] Fidel Castro told [redacted] at a meeting in Moscow in April 1977 that Cuba was helping the Katangan nationalists because once Katanga fell, Zaire would fall like a house of cards,

--According to a February 1977 report [redacted] the Katangans were not a significant threat until 1975 when they were reequiped and reorganized by Cuban advisers,

[redacted] reported in May 1977 that his contacts had informed him that Cuban and East German personnel were training the insurgents in 1976 and early 1977 and that the Cubans had controlled the shipment of arms and equipment from Luanda to a rebel training base in February 1977,

--In March 1976, [redacted] Cuba would train and support Zairian forces opposed to President Mobutu. Castro reportedly described the effort as an act of revenge for the death of Patrice Lumumba.

Although the FNLC now depends on Angola for sanctuary and on Cuba and the USSR for a continued supply of arms and equipment, the FNLC probably has some freedom of action regarding tactics and local objectives, and, to a degree, the timing of specific operations. The Cubans, Soviets, and Angolans certainly must have a veto over FNLC activities, however. The rebels have received support from a number of quarters--including the Belgians and Portuguese in the early 1960's--and they would be capable of training their own recruits and launching a one-shot operation independently if they were willing to take the risk that such wholly independent operations might put them at cross-purposes with the Cubans, Soviets, and Angolans.

Once inside Shaba, the degree of Cuban/Soviet/Angolan control over them would probably be much smaller. The FNLC

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25X1 can also draw on a large number of sympathizers and guerrillas in place throughout the Shaba region to support its operations once they are across the border. According to [REDACTED] the insurgents were given support by the population of Kolwezi during the attack; many townspeople willingly hid the rebels from French and Zairian soldiers.

25X1 Evidence concerning the possible presence of Cubans in Zaire has been sparse. The Zairians claim, however, that Cuban personnel are fighting with the rebels [REDACTED] [REDACTED] reported on May 24 that a [REDACTED] citizen trapped in Kolwezi told a member of the cooperation commission that he had been spared only after conversing in Spanish with some Cubans. This is the most credible report to date that Spanish-speakers, presumably Cubans, accompanied the rebels into Zaire.

We believe Havana would not have wanted to risk having Cubans involved in combat in Zaire, but we cannot rule out the possibility that a few Cubans did accompany the invaders into the Shaba region. We presume that the Cuban leadership recognize that concrete proof of its involvement will be difficult to obtain as long as Cuban nationals are not captured in Zairian territory.

25X1 Cuban advisers, however, probably did accompany the rebels to the border. [REDACTED] has said that the [REDACTED] on May 8 that Cuban personnel were organizing the movement of a large number of FNLC troops from northeastern Angola towards the Zambian border. According to this information, the Cubans were accompanying this force as advisers, but there was no confirmation that the Cubans actually entered Zaire. This report was seemingly confirmed by the statements made by the two rebels to [REDACTED] last week.

25X1 Based on a limited number of reports, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] we believe that the FNLC has received arms and equipment from the Soviets, Cubans, and possibly other Communist countries. [REDACTED] reported that two "Cuban or Soviet" ships unloaded weapons--mostly small arms

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and ammunition--in Luanda harbor in early October 1977 that were destined for the sole use of the FNLC. [REDACTED]

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The insurgents very probably also receive substantial Communist material aid indirectly through the Angolan armed forces and other sources, including the open market. Weapons captured from the rebels during the recent fighting reportedly included Soviet AK-47 assault rifles, US M-16 rifles, French rifles, and Belgian munitions.

According to [REDACTED], Soviet and East German advisers have been training FNLC guerrillas for one year and possibly longer. Most of this instruction reportedly takes place in northeastern Angola near Saurimo where large Cuban and Angolan military camps are also located.

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[REDACTED] have reported that prior to early 1977 Angolan President Neto was reluctant to provide assistance to the FNLC and on occasion was kept unaware of the extent of Angolan and Cuban support for the rebels. This could explain in part why he is unwilling to acknowledge involvement with or responsibility for the rebels' actions. Neto has promised to give refugees fleeing the hostilities safe passage and to release any hostages brought into Angola by the FNLC.

On May 21 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] stating that any hostages arriving in Angola would be released and returned to their home country if they so wished; he asked in return for assurances from France and other countries that their forces would not invade Angola. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] claiming Cuban involvement with the FNLC. Given the high probability of bias in these claims, we have discounted all reports from Zairian sources in making our judgments on the extent of foreign involvement with the rebels.

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The Zairians have also claimed that Algeria and Libya have been providing support to the FNLC. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] has stated that 250 "Angolans" were given a four month training course in Libya early this year. It would be unusual to send Angolan government soldiers to Libya for training and the soldiers may have actually been members of the FNLC or some other southern African liberation group that has bases in Angola. The Libyans, however, have vigorously denied any involvement with the Katangans.

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